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REGULATING DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING WITH TORT LAW: IS THE
LAW FINALLY CATCHING UP
WITH THE MARKET?
TIMOTHY

S.

HALL*

ABSTRACT

Should direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs im
pose any tort duty on the drug manufacturer and advertiser to ensure
that the advertisements present a fair picture of the risks and benefits
of the drug? Until very recently, the answer of American courts has
overwhelmingly been "no." However, recently there has been both a
rise in concern over the content and effects of direct-to-consumer ad
vertisements and signs of an emerging trend among courts to con
sider the possibility that a drug company that chooses to bypass
traditional avenues of communication of information about prescrip
tion drugs should bear responsibility in tort for the content of its di
rect communications with consumers. This emerging trend has not
yet reached critical mass, however, and in at least one case, the pen
dulum has arguably swung too far in the opposite direction. This
Article will discuss recent developments in the litigation surrounding
direct-to-consumer advertising, and suggest avenues of development
for tort law in this important area.
The American experiment with product-specific, direct-to-con
sumer advertising of prescription drugs is, as of this writing, approx
imately twenty years old. l Despite two decades of increasing
spending on such advertisements? reviews of this practice are de
cidedly mixed. Few other industrialized nations permit such adver

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of
Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
1. See Timothy S. Hall, Bypassing the Learned Intermediary: Potential Liability
for Failure to Warn in Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 2 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'y 449, 451-52 (1993).
2. Spending on direct-to-consumer advertising in 2007 was estimated at $4.8 bil
lion, up three-hundred percent from 1997. Stephanie Saul, For Jarvik Heart Pioneer,
Drug Ads Raise Profile and Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at AI; see also Steve
Lohr, Publications on Fitness and Health Head to Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at
333
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tisement,3 and there is little data indicating that the practice of
advertising prescription drugs directly to consumers improves
health outcomes, enhances the physician-patient relationship, or
has any positive effect other than improving sales of pharmaceutical
products. 4 Indeed, substantial questions remain about whether di
rect-to-consumer advertisement as currently practiced violates the
first principle of medical ethics, primum non nocere-first, do no
harm.s Critics of direct-to-consumer advertising argue that such
advertisements do not present a balanced picture of a drug's risks
and benefits; that they undermine the physician-patient relation
ship; and that they inappropriately drive up demand for drugs that
provide larger profit margins, not greater therapeutic benefit. 6 Re
search has shown that advertised drugs are disproportionately
newly approved drugs, which may still be under patent protection
and thus offer larger profit margins than other drugs in the same
therapeutic class. 7
In spite of these concerns, there has been little effective regula
tion of the direct-to-consumer advertising market to date. How
ever, two recent developments suggest that the law may be catching
up to the regulatory needs of this market. First, in May 2008 Con
gress took note of the criticisms of direct-to-consumer advertising
C1 (stating that Internet "advertising for prescription drugs has increased nearly five
fold in the last four years, to $163 million").
3. See Alan Cassels, Canada May Be Forced to Allow Direct to Consumer Adver
tising, 332 BRIT. MED. 1.1469 (2006); Rory Watson, EU Health Ministers Reject Propo
sal for Limited Direct to Consumer Advertising, 326 BRIT. MED. 1. 1284 (2003); Erin J.
Asher, Comment, Lesson Learned from New Zealand: Pro-Active Industry Shift To

wards Self-Regulation of Direct to Consumer Advertising Will Improve Compliance with
FDA, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 599, 600 (2006).
4. Kate Pickert, Do Consumers Understand Drug Ads?, TIME, May 15, 2008,
http://www.time.com/health/article/0.8599.1806946.00.html(reporting that every one
thousand dollars invested in direct-to-consumer advertising results in twenty-four new
prescriptions for the advertised drug).
5. See generally THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (5th ed. 2001) (discussing the ethical basis for the traditional med
ical precept of: "First, Do No Harm").
6. See, e.g., Stephanie Saul & Alex Berenson, Lipitor Maker Digs in to Fight
Generic Rival, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2007, at Al (describing drug manufacturer Pfizer's
increased use of direct-to-consumer advertisements to counter the market effect of
FDA approval of a generic competitor to its flagship cholesterol drug Lipitor); Stepha
nie Saul, Sleep Drugs Found Only Mildly Effective, but Wildly Popular, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2007, at F4 (describing reports that, despite advertising claims of increased
safety, advertised drugs, in fact, had many of the same problems as competing drugs).
7. See generally Julie M. Donohue, Marisa Cevasco & Meredith B. Rosenthal, A
Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 673 (2007).
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with hearings addressing potential problems with three specific tele
vision advertisements for prescription drugs and a legislative propo
sal to restrict direct-to-consumer advertising. 8 Second, in the last
two years, two courts have explicitly focused on the direct-to-con
sumer advertising market by adopting changes to the tort law gov
erning prescription drugs. 9 This Article will discuss these changes,
with an emphasis on the regulatory potential of tort law.
In May 2008, Congressman John Dingell, Chair of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee, held hearings to explore issues
surrounding direct-to-consumer drug advertising, with particular fo
cus on advertisements for three drugs: Lipitor, Vytorin, and
Procrit. 1Q The first two of these drugs are designed to lower choles
terol levels and thus prevent heart disease, and the latter is de
signed to combat anemia in connection with chemotherapy.!l
The Lipitor advertisement featured heart researcher Robert
Jarvik as pitchman for the drug.1 2 Criticism of this ad campaign
focused on the facts that at the time he was recommending Lipitor
to potential consumers, Jarvik was not a licensed physician; that he
stated in the advertisement that he himself took the drug, which
was not accurate at the time the ads aired; and that a scene in the ad
that purported to be Jarvik rowing on a lake was staged with a body
double.13
Congressman Bart Stupak stated at the hearing that while ad
vertisements for Vytorin were generating five-billion dollars in sales
in 2007, studies indicating that Vytorin was no more effective than
other, less expensive available treatments were not released by the
S. See Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: Marketing, Education, or Deception?:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 1l0th Congo (200S) [hereinafter Direct-to-Consumer Hearings].
9. See Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D.N.M. 200S); State ex
reI. Johnson & Johnson Corp. V. Karl, 647 S.E.2d S99 (W. Va. 2007).
10. Alison Bass, A Dose of Honesty in Prescription Drug Ads, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 2, 200S, at A15. Congressional hearings have also been held on the subject of
direct-to-consumer advertisements for medical devices. See Barry Meier, Consumer
Ads for Medical Devices Subject of Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 200S, at C12.
Because the regulatory frameworks for medical devices and prescription drugs are dif
ferent, this Article will focus exclusively on prescription drugs. However, many of the
issues raised herein are paralleled in the market for medical devices.
11. Bass, supra note 10, at Al5.
12. See George J. Annas, Health Care Reform in America: Beyond Ideology, 5
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 441 (200S).
13. Direct-to-Consumer Hearings, supra note S, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Bart
Stupak, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Subcommittees/
OI-Stupak/050S0S.0Lhrg.DTC.pdf.
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manufacturer. 14 Congressman Stupak also alleged that the adver
tisements for Procrit intimated possible off-label uses of the drug,
the advertising of which is "prohibited by the FDA,"15 but that the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) did not intervene to stop
this inappropriate marketing. 16
In follow-up letters to pharmaceutical companies and the Phar
maceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Congressmen
Stupak and Dingell requested that drug manufacturers commit to
six specific steps in order to improve the quality of direct-to-con
sumer advertisements and reduce the instance of deceptive and
misleading advertisements. These were: (1) to follow the American
Medical Association's (AMA) guidelines regarding the use of
health professionals in direct-to-consumer advertisements; (2) to
not market directly to consumers until valid data regarding out
comes are available for a drug; (3) to adopt a two-year moratorium
on direct-to-consumer advertisements; (4) to not market off-label
uses for products in direct-to-consumer advertisements; (5) to pro
vide a toll-free telephone number for reporting adverse effects of
medical products 17 in all direct-to-consumer advertisements; and
(6) to include any FDA-mandated "black box" warnings in direct
to-consumer advertisements. I8
FDA oversight of direct-to-consumer advertisements has been
inadequate. In fact, despite the substantial increases in the indus
try's direct marketing budgets, the pace of warning letters sent by
the FDA to pharmaceutical manufacturers questioning the content
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. The FDA currently maintains such a reporting service called MedWatch. See
MedWatch, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, http://www.fda.gov/medwatch (last
visited Apr. 15, 2009).
18. Letter from Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy & Com
merce, and Rep. Bart Stupak, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigation,
to William C. Weldon, Chairman & CEO, Johnson & Johnson (May 20, 2008), http://
energycommerce .house .govIPress_11 O/llO-Itr .052008.JohnsonandJoh nson. pdf.
A "black box" warning is a warning of known, serious risks associated with a drug's
use. These warnings are mandated as part of the drug-approval process for serious risks
known at the time of approval. See Henry Grabowski & Y. Richard Wang, Do Faster
Food and Drug Administration Drug Reviews Adversely Affect Patient Safety?: An Anal
ysis of the 1992 Prescription Drug User Fee Act, 51 J. L. & ECON. 377, 384 (2008). These
warnings can also be added to a drug's required labeling if risks are discovered after the
drug is approved. See Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment?: False Assump
tions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI.
& TECH. 61, 79 n.58 (2008) ("Black box warnings are the most severe warnings the
FDA can issue for a drug that is to remain on the market despite newly discovered
adverse effects. ").
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of their ads has dropped dramatically in the last decade_ 19 Only 21
such letters were sent in 2006, compared with 142 in 1997.20 While
one could argue that this represents a trend towards more appropri
ate drug advertisement, the problems with current drug advertise
ments pointed out in the recent congressional hearings suggest
otherwise. 21
Recently proposed legislation would limit the ability of drug
manufacturers to advertise directly to consumers within a certain
number of years of the approval of a new drug by the FDA.22 This
issue also became a minor point in the Democratic primaries lead
ing up to the 2008 presidential election.23 The most recent version
of this proposal was introduced in the House of Representatives by
Representative Rosa DeLauro of Connecticut. 24 This bill would
prohibit direct-to-consumer advertising within three years of FDA
approval of a new drug. 25 Exceptions would provide for earlier ad
vertising of a drug if it is determined that such advertising "would
have an affirmative value to public health."26 Additionally, an ex
tension of the ban beyond the initial three years would occur "if ...
the drug ... has significant adverse health effects based on post
approval studies, risk-benefit analyses, adverse event reports, the
scientific literature, any clinical or observational studies, or any
other appropriate resource."27 The proposal would also require
any direct-to-consumer advertising to contain "a fair balance ... of
the benefits and the risks associated with the drug."28
19.

Donahue, Cevasco & Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 676-77.

20.

Id.

21. See Letter from Rep. John D. DingelJ, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, & Bart Stupak, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigation, to
Hon. W.J. Tauzin, President & CEO, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. (May 20, 2008),
http://energycommerce.house.govlPress_1l0/11O-ltr.052008.PRMA.pdf (stating that the
Committee "did not obtain adequate assurances that [drug manufacturers] would re
duce misleading and deceptive DTC advertisements").
22. See Responsibility in Drug and Device Advertising Act of 2008, H.R. 6151,
1l0th Congo (2008).
23. See Edwards Unveils Plan to Control Drug Advertising, REUTERS, Oct. 28,
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN28439707.
24. See Responsibility in Drug and Device Advertising Act of 2008. Previous
legislative proposals have suggested a two-year moratorium. They have also attempted
to use the tax system to disincentivize direct-to-consumer advertisements by denying
deductions for advertisements that fail to present the risks of the drug or occur within
two years of the drug's approval. See Fair Balance Prescription Drug Advertisement
Act of 2007, H.R. 2823, 1l0th Congo (2007).
25. See Responsibility in Drug and Device Advertising Act § 2(a)(2).
26. Id.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
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For those who believe that the costs of direct-to-consumer ad
vertising outweigh the benefits, the current state of affairs seems
grim. Spending on this advertising, while still dwarfed by expendi
tures on other forms of drug promotion, is rising rapidly, and, ac
cording to recent research, is effective in promoting-perhaps
overpromoting-use of the advertised drugs. 29 The drugs chosen
for direct-to-consumer advertisements seem to be chosen not ac
cording to the likely benefit to the potential patients, but according
to the need to promote newly approved drugs, which may them
selves have unknown or unclear risk profiles compared to others on
the markepo Despite these factors, there has been significantly less
enforcement of such advertising by the regulatory agencies in the
past decade. 31 Additionally, proposals for more strict regulation,
such as bans on advertisements during the first years of a drug's
approval,32 are of questionable constitutionality.33 What, if any
thing, can be done to minimize future abuses of American drug
manufacturers' privilege to communicate directly with potential
consumers of their drugs?
This Article argues that the answer is found in the application
of tort law to direct-to-consumer advertising. However, in order to
achieve meaningful regulation of direct-to-consumer advertising
through tort law, the courts must be convinced to substantially alter
the application of the so-called "learned intermediary rule,"34
which, as currently applied by the majority of courts, prevents virtu
ally all failure-to-warn suits by consumers against pharmaceutical
manufacturers. This Article will briefly discuss the learned inter
mediary rule in the context of pharmaceutical failure-to-warn liabil
ity, and will set forth a proposed change to the application of the
rule that would enable consumers of prescription drugs to hold drug
29. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
30. See supra text accompanying note 7.
31. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
33. Substantial questions exist as to whether any ban on direct-to-consumer ad
vertisements would be enforceable given current commercial speech doctrine under the
First Amendment. See, e.g., Miriam Shuchman, Drug Risks and Free Speech-Can
Congress Ban Consumer Drug Ads?, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2236 (2007).
34. The learned intermediary rule allows manufacturers to rely on the skill and
expertise of an intermediary to furnish appropriate warnings to the consumer of the
product. In the case of prescription drugs, "[t]he obligation of a manufacturer to warn
about risks attendant to the use of drugs and medical devices that may be sold only
pursuant to a health care provider's prescription traditionally has required warnings
directed to health care providers and not to patients." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUcrS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. b (1997).
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manufacturers liable for deceptive advertising in appropriate
circumstances.
The current regulatory system is ineffective to ensure a safe
and efficient flow of information about drugs to the potential con
sumers of those drugs. Policymakers face two fundamental options
if the status quo is inadequate: either ban the practice of direct-to
consumer advertising altogether or further regulate the practice. A
total ban on direct-to-consumer advertising is suboptimal for two
reasons. First, as several commentators have suggested, the First
Amendment may operate to protect the type of speech in which
pharmaceutical manufacturers are engaged. 35 Second, a ban ig
nores the substantial potential benefits of an increased flow of in
formation to consumers of prescription drugs. 36 For these reasons,
improved regulation of direct-to-consumer advertisement is a supe
rior alternative to an outright ban on the practice.
However, the remaining question is how to implement effec
tive regulation. The most recent legislative proposal has been for a
temporal ban on direct-to-consumer advertisement. This proposal
would ban direct advertisement of a prescription drug within two
years of FDA approva1. 37 It has the benefit of addressing the per
verse incentive in the direct-to-consumer advertising market re
garding which drugs get advertised. Generally, the tendency has
been for advertisements to disproportionately feature drugs that ei
ther generate higher revenue for the manufacturer-drugs that
have been recently approved are more likely to enjoy patent pro
tection, and correspondingly higher profit margins38-or drugs that

35. Shuchman, supra note 33, at 223S.
36. See Jaclyn Carole Hill, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Beyond: Ex
ploring Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising in the New Millennium, 72 DEF. COUNS.
J. 362, 376 (2005) ("[T]he public should ultimately realize that the greater good of the
community is served by allowing for the advertisement of prescription drugs."); see also
Jennifer Girod, Note, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: An Efficient Protection for
Patients Past and Present, 40 IND. L. REV. 397 (2007); Corey Schaecher, Comment, Ask
Your Doctor if This Product is Right for You, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 421 (2007).
37. See supra notes 24-2S and accompanying text.
3S. See, e.g., Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, lOS COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (200S) ("In the prescription
drug market, a patent holder-usually the brand name drug manufacturer that devel
oped the pioneer drug, like Eli Lilly-has time-limited, exclusive rights to market its
patented drug, allowing it to realize hefty profits. Upon the patent's expiration ...
market competition replaces the previously lawful monopoly: Manufacturers of generic
drugs (generic manufacturers) enter the market, and the incumbent brand name manu
facturer may face a steep drop in profits and market share." (footnotes omitted)).
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are attempting to tap into new markets for which no competing
treatments exist. 39
Two main critiques of direct-to-consumer advertising arise
from these practices. The first critique is that direct-to-consumer
advertisements tend to overmedicalize conditions previously con
sidered within the range of "normal" human experience.4o This in
creases drug sales, but also has the effect of driving up the cost of
health care and diverting health care resources from more serious
health issues. The second critique stems from the fact that new
drugs often have incomplete safety data despite their FDA ap
proval. Thus, direct advertisement may lead to overuse of these
products by misrepresenting the risk-benefit calculation versus
other treatment options in the marketplace. 41
Given these perverse incentives, the proposal to temporally re
strict direct-to-consumer advertisements has some appeal. How
ever, this proposal has not yet been successful in Congress, and
there are commentators who argue that such restrictions would run
afoul of the constitutional protection given to commercial speech.42
Even if such legislative proposals were adopted and found to be
constitutional in inevitable court challenges, such a ban would not
address remaining issues such as off-label promotions and general
overpromotion of the benefits versus harms of a drug. Moreover,
39. For example, the diagnosis of "restless leg syndrome" has been challenged as
being driven in part by drug companies' desire to promote pharmaceutical treatment
for this condition. See, e.g., Steven Woloshin & Lisa M. Schwartz, Giving Legs to Rest
less Legs: A Case Study of How the Media Helps Make People Sick, 3 PLoS MED. 452
(2006), http://www.plosmedicine.orgiarticie/info%3Adoi % 2F1 0.1371 % 2Fjournal. pmed.
0030170.
40. See generally id. and other "disease-mongering" articles in that symposium.
41. An example of this phenomenon is the marketing and subsequent withdrawal
from market of the pain drug Vioxx, which was widely prescribed despite, as later data
showed, its greater risk of cardiac side effects and lack of greater efficacy than other
pain drugs then on the market. The marketing withdrawal and litigation surrounding
Vioxx has been widely discussed. See, e.g., David R. Culp & Isobel M. Berry, Merck
and the Vioxx Debacle: Deadly Loyalty, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1 (2007);
Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vi
oxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 741 (2005); Margaret
Gilhooley, Vioxx's History and the Need for Better Procedures and Better Testing, 37
SETON HALL L. REV. 941 (2007); Ronald M. Green, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
and Pharmaceutical Ethics: The Case of Vioxx, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 749 (2006);
Jennifer Wolsing, The Vioxx Litigation: Disincentivizing Patient Safety Through Misdi
rected Tort Rules, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 209 (2008).
42. See, e.g., Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to
Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2008); Mark I.
Schwartz, To Ban or Not to Ban- That is the Question: The Constitutionality ofa Mora
torium on Consumer Drug Advertising, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1 (2008).
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in the absence of a private enforcement mechanism, it is by no
means clear that the FDA has either the resources or the inclination
to adequately police any new restrictions on direct-to-consumer
advertisements.
I have in the past proposed, and continue to advocate for, a
solution that requires no legislative action and thus bypasses the
current legislative gridlock on this issue. 43 I propose that common
law tort doctrine embrace its regulatory potential in the context of
direct-to-consumer advertisements. To date, the majority of courts
addressing the issue have been unwilling to impose tort liability for
harms arising from direct-to-consumer advertisements, due in large
part to a historic failure to adapt common law doctrine to the needs
of the current marketplace for pharmaceutical products. 44 How
ever, in 2007 and 2008, gaps have appeared in the wall of protection
surrounding drug manufacturers.
The most important legal doctrine governing liability of pre
scription drug manufacturers to the ultimate users of their products
is the learned intermediary rule. 45 Products liability law generally
holds the manufacturer of a defective product liable to an end user
harmed through the use of the product. 46 In the prescription drug
context, the defective nature of the product is generally not a manu
facturing defect, but rather a lack of an appropriate warning about
the relative risks and benefits of the product. 47 By their very na
ture, prescription drugs can present a danger of harm to the user
even when used properly.48 As inherently dangerous products, pre
scription drugs do not generate liability for harms caused by the
proper use of the product, so long as they are accompanied by ade
quate warnings and instructions. 49 The provision of such warnings
43. See Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New
Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193 (2004).
44. See generally id. (providing a complete account of changes in the pharmaceu
tical marketplace, including, but not limited to, the rise of direct-to-consumer advertis
ing and the implications for tort law).
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcrS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. b (1997);
see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcrS LIABILITY § 1 ("One engaged
in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a
defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the
defect. ").
47. Id. § 6(b)(3) cmt. a ("Until recently, courts refused to impose liability based
on defective designs of drugs ... sold only by prescription.").
48. Id. § 6(b)(3) cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k
(1984).
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcrs LIABILITY § 6(d).
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and instructions shifts the risk from the manufacturer of the prod
uct to the user who freely chose to use the producPo
In the vast majority of non-pharmaceutical settings, manufac
turers must deliver warnings and instructions to the end user of a
product in order to be legally protected. 51 However, because pre
scription drugs are not ordinarily available directly to patients, but
are only available through the intervention of a licensed physician
as a gatekeeper, courts have traditionally held that the necessary
warnings must be given to the prescribing physician and not to the
end user of the drug. 52 Therefore, the provision of adequate warn
ings to the physician is a defense to a products liability claim
brought against the manufacturer by a patient harmed by the
drug.53 This is the learned intermediary rule, and it acknowledges
that, unlike most other products, the decision whether to use a pre
scription drug is not made solely by the patient, but rather is made
in conjunction with and after consultation with a physician upon
whose education and training a patient relies to make a decision
when selecting an appropriate drug. 54 Because pharmacology is
such a complex field, the patient is not considered capable of under
standing the drug's warnings and instructions or making rational
decisions based on the benefits and risks of the drug without the
intervention of a physician. 55
The learned intermediary rule makes sense for a certain vision
of the physician-patient relationship.56 However, as described in
more detail elsewhere,57 the modern doctor-patient relationship
often deviates from that ideal in what should be legally significant
ways. Except to a very limited extent, the law has not recognized
these changes in the health care marketplace. These changes in
clude, in addition to the proliferation of direct-to-consumer adver
50. As one recent commentator put it, provision of effective warnings "recast[ ]
the user as the least-cost-avoider of injury." See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E.
Appel, Effective Communication of Warnings in the Workplace: Avoiding Injuries in
Working with Industrial Materials, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1 (2008).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcrS LIABILITY § 2(c) cmt. i
("[D]epending on the circumstances, Subsection c may require that instructions and
warning be given not only to purchasers, users and consumers, but also to others who a
reasonable seller should know will be in a position to reduce or avoid the risk of harm."
(emphasis added)).
52. Id. § 6.
53. Id.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1984).
55. Hall, supra note 43, at 202-03.
56. Id. at 195-96.
57. Id.
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tlsmg over the last twenty years, the following: (1) increased
emphasis on the patient as ultimate decision-maker in the health
care context, as opposed to more traditionally authoritative models
of the physician-patient relationship;58 (2) massive investment by
the pharmaceutical industry in research and development of new
drug therapies;59 (3) an increased emphasis within the pharmaceuti
cal industry on so-called "lifestyle" drugs;60 and (4) increased avail
ability of prescription drugs through nontraditional and often illegal
outlets, including Internet pharmacies and importation from other
countries. 61 Although all of these changes suggest that the learned
intermediary rule has been outstripped by market developments,
this Article focuses on the effect of direct-to-consumer
advertisements.
The law permits drug companies to communicate directly with
patients, thus generating demand for the advertised drugs, but it
insulates them from liability to those same patients based upon
those communications. Therefore, the law currently sets up a sig
nificant market distortion that overincentivizes expenditure on di
rect-to-consumer advertisements.
In 1999, just as the pharmaceutical industry's investments in
direct-to-consumer advertisements were skyrocketing,62 one court
took note of the effect of direct-to-consumer advertising on the
physician-patient relationship and the learned intermediary rule. In
Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc., the Supreme Court of New Jersey
held that direct advertisement of Norplant, an implantable long
term contraceptive drug, prevented the application of the learned
intermediary rule to the plaintiff's claim as a matter of New Jersey
law. 63 In limiting the application of the learned intermediary rule,
the court relied explicitly on the intentional act of the drug manu
58. Id. at 226-28.
59. Id. at 228.
60. Id. at 229-30. The term "lifestyle drug" refers to therapies developed or mar
keted for cosmetic or functional enhancement rather than for the treatment of a disease
as that term is traditionally interpreted. See generally Kim H. Finley, Comment, Life,
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Viagra?: Demand for "Lifestyle" Drugs Raises Legal and
Public Policy Issues, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 837 (2000). Classes of drugs deemed "lifestyle
drugs" by the Medicaid program "include weight loss, weight gain, infertility, drugs for
cosmetic purposes or hair growth, drugs for symptomatic relief of coughs and colds,
smoking cessation products, and vitamins and minerals." Joshua Parsons Cohen et aI.,
Role of Budget Impact in Drug Reimbursement Decisions, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y &
L. 225, 233 (2008) (citation omitted).
61. Hall, supra note 43, at 230-3l.
62. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
63. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1256 (N.J. 1999).
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facturer in "seek[ing] to influence a patient's choice" through "di
rect claims to consumers for the efficacy of its product" as a
justification for imposition of a duty to warn the drug consumer of
the risks attendant upon use of the drug, rather than merely warn
ing the prescribing physician. 64
After Perez, commentators opined that other courts would fol
low the lead of New Jersey in limiting the protection of the learned
intermediary rule for drug manufacturers who engage in direct-to
consumer marketing. 65 However, for almost a decade after the
Perez case, despite invitations by litigants to extend Perez to other
jurisdictions, no other court chose to follow Perez's lead. That state
of affairs may now be changing.
In the past two years, two more courts have explicitly declined
to extend the protection of the learned intermediary rule to pre
scription drug manufacturers, citing, inter alia, the prevalence of di
rect-to-consumer advertising to justify their holdings. First, in the
case of Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl,66 the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, after a thorough discussion of the direct
to-consumer advertising market67 and an analysis of the adoption of
the learned intermediary rule in other American jurisdictions,68
concluded that the "justifications for the learned intermediary doc
trine [are] largely outdated and unpersuasive. "69 It declined to
adopt the rule as part of the common law of tort in West VirginiaJo
In Karl, the plaintiff's decedent was prescribed Propulsid, a
drug manufactured by Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc.71 Unfortu
nately, she died three days after taking the drugJ2 Plaintiff sued
both the prescribing physician and the drug manufacturer under
products liability and medical negligence theories of liability.73
Janssen moved for summary judgment on the grounds of the
learned intermediary doctrine, but the trial court denied this mo
tion because the learned intermediary rule had not been explicitly
64.

65.
66.
67.
68.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Jd. at 1247.
Jd.
Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007).
Jd. at 907-09.
Jd. at 903-05.
Jd. at 906.
Jd. at 901.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
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adopted by the West Virginia's highest courtJ4 The lower court
also denied a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence relating
to the question of whether the manufacturer had a duty to directly
warn the consumer of the drug's dangersJ5 Janssen appealed both
of these rulings to West Virginia's Supreme Court by filing a peti
tion for a writ of prohibition,76 which the court deniedJ7
In denying the writ of prohibition and allowing the lower
court's orders to stand, the West Virginia court relied on two main
arguments. First, the court articulated a different calculation as to
how many jurisdictions have in fact adopted the learned intermedi
ary rule. Unlike the court in In re Norplant, which calculated that
the doctrine has been adopted in forty-eight states,78 or the court in
Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., which concluded that thirty-four states have
adopted the rule,79 the Karl court, using a somewhat more restric
tive methodology, concluded that only twenty-two states have de
finitively adopted the rule-twenty-one by judicial adoption and
one by statute. 80 The Karl court reached this result by looking only
to binding pronouncements by the highest court in each state, and
did not include lower court decisions as the other opinions had. 81
Thus, the Karl court viewed the learned intermediary rule as a doc
trine on which the states are split roughly down the middle, rather
than the virtual unanimity that prevails in other courts' views.
Second, the Karl court gave special consideration to changes in
the pharmaceutical marketplace and the physician-patient relation
ship since the rule was first articulated and widely adopted. The
court concluded that two changes in particular merit rejection of
the rule: "the initiation and intense proliferation of direct-to-con
sumer advertising, along with its impact on the physician-patient
relationship, and the development of the internet as a common
method of dispensing and obtaining prescription drug informa
tion. "82 The court noted that these "[s]ignificant changes in the
74. Id. In the past, several federal courts had predicted that West Virginia would,
in fact, adopt the learned intermediary rule, should the question be presented.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. !d.
78. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 806
(E.D. Tex. 2002).
79. Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 768 (Ky. 2004).
80. Karl, 647 S.E.2d at 903-04. The one state adopting the rule by statute is North
Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5(c) (2007).
81. Karl, 647 S.E.2d at 903-04.
82. !d. at 907.
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drug industry have post-dated the adoption of the learned interme
diary doctrine"83 and specifically noted that "[s]ince the 1997
proliferation of [direct-to-consumer] advertising, only four high
courts have adopted the learned intermediary doctrine."84 Further
more, those four courts failed to give "thorough consideration to
... direct-to-consumer advertising"85 when deciding to adopt the
rule.
Interestingly, there is no mention in the Karl opinion of a claim
by the plaintiff that the decedent saw, relied upon, or was unduly
influenced by direct-to-consumer advertising. Although the attor
ney for the plaintiff argued in the brief that the existence of direct
to-consumer advertising for Propulsid should justify an exception to
the learned intermediary rule,86 the brief contains no allegation that
the decedent relied on, or even saw, that advertising in the course
of being prescribed and taking the medication that allegedly caused
her death.
After Karl, one other court has expressly declined to adopt the
learned intermediary rule, although in a different context and for
different reasons. In Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,87 the Federal Dis
trict Court for the District of New Mexico refused to certify the
question of whether New Mexico would adopt the learned interme
diary rule as a matter of state tort law, and instead predicted that
the Supreme Court of New Mexico would not adopt the rule. Al
though the Rimbert case does not include claims relating to direct
to-consumer advertising, the court discussed the Karl opinion in
reaching its decision. 88 The Rimbert court relied more strongly on
its interpretation of the New Mexico courts' strict liability jurispru
dence, concluding that "the learned-intermediary doctrine ... is
fundamentally inconsistent with New Mexico's strict-liability juris
prudence."89 The Rimbert court reasoned that since the learned in
termediary rule insulates the drug manufacturer from liability, it
necessarily shifts that liability onto the physician, undermining the
goal of strict liability, which is "to ensure that the risk of loss for
83. Id.
84. Id. at 908-09.
85. Id. at 909; see also Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829 (Conn. 2001); Mc
Combs v. Synthes, 587 S.E.2d 594 (Ga. 2003); Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758 (Ky.
2004); Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 2000).
86. Brief of Respondent at 26-27, Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d
899 (W. Va. 2006) (No. 33211).
87. Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D.N.M. 2008).
88. Id. at 1193-94.
89. Id. at 1215.
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Injury resulting from defective products is borne by the
suppliers."90
Despite the Karl and Rimbert opinions, not all recent learned
intermediary rule decisions have taken the side of restricting the
application of the rule. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in
Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., adopted the rule for the Commonwealth of
Kentucky.91 The court did so over the dissent of Justice Winter
sheimer, who urged the court to take more account of changes in
the medical marketplace, such as the rise of direct-to-consumer ad
vertising. 92 Similarly, in Porter v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,93 the District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia rejected a plaintiff's
claim that Georgia courts would "reject the learned intermediary
doctrine and require direct warnings to consumers" based on its
reading of recent Georgia jurisprudence in this area. 94
Some recent learned intermediary rule cases are more ambigu
ous. The United States District Court for the District of South Da
kota denied a plaintiff's motion to compel discovery related to
direct-to-consumer advertising in a drug-related product liability
action. In Schilfv. Eli Lilly & CO.,95 the court used two avenues of
reasoning to reject a tort plaintiff's request for information on the
defendant's direct marketing practices as part of its discovery.
First, the court accepted the defendant's arguments that the state of
South Dakota had already adopted the learned intermediary doc
trine, so this evidence would not be relevant to a claim or defense in
the case. 96 Second, the court noted that "[p ]laintiffs are not factu
ally positioned to persuasively argue that Lilly's direct marketing
efforts rendered the prescribing doctor less important in choosing
[the drug for plaintiff] to use, i.e. that the learned intermediary was
not the person who selected" the treatment. 97
90. Id. at 1215, 1217 ("Allowing drug manufacturers to shift the burden of defec
tive product to physicians would undermine the Supreme Court of New Mexico's con
clusion that the burden should be on the manufacturer ...."). It is a weakness of the
district court's reasoning that none of the cases on which it relies for its view of New
Mexico's strict liability jurisprudence are pharmaceutical liability cases.
91. Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 770 (Ky. 2004).
92. Id. at 770-71 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
93. Porter v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:06-CV-1297-JOF, 2008 WL 544739 (N.D. Ga.
2008).
94. Id. at *8-9.
95. Schilf v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. CIV 07-4015, 2008 WL 4442557 (D.S.D. 2008).
96. Id. at *1.
97. /d. Although the thesis of this Article is that courts should consider direct-to
consumer advertising relevant to the learned intermediary rule, if the Schilt court is
correct that the plaintiff's "use of Cymbalta was not directly or indirectly related to
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In Mendez Montes de Oca v. Adventis Pharma, the District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico considered the learned inter
mediary rule in the context of the plaintiff's allegations regarding
direct-to-consumer advertising. 98 The court held that the learned
intermediary rule barred plaintiff's claim that defendant's synthetic
insulin caused the decedent's cancer and subsequent death. 99 How
ever, a close reading of this case calls into question exactly what the
court intended to hold with regard to direct-to-consumer advertis
ing and the learned intermediary rule. While the court stated that
no case since Perez had applied a direct-to-consumer exception to
the rule,lOO the court also stated that "plaintiffs have failed to ex
plain why the circumstances surrounding this particular product
should trump the reasons for the rule."lOl Thus, it is a reasonable
reading of the case that, although the court may be amenable to
articulating a direct-to-consumer advertising exception in an appro
priate case, the plaintiff in Mendez simply failed to make an ade
quate showing to justify such a departure from traditional
doctrine. 102 This is buttressed by the court's conclusion that mere
allegations "that defendant conducted direct to consumer advertis
ing.... without more, is not sufficient to defeat defendant's learned
intermediary defense. "103
There has been more doctrinal movement in the last two years
on this issue than in the previous six post-Perez years. While the
ultimate doctrinal outcome is still in doubt, the courts should con
tinue this trend, as a matter of common law tort doctrine, to modify
the learned intermediary rule to allow the tort system to perform its
traditional regulatory function in the context of prescription drug
advertising. However, the courts should not, as West Virginia has
done, throw out the baby with the bathwater. The Karl court, while
it should be commended for its detailed attention to the changes in
the health care marketplace over the last decade, went too far. It
went even further than the New Jersey court in Perez, which was
Lilly's direct marketing efforts," then the substantive outcome of this motion seems
correct. Id.
98. Mendez Montes de Oca v. Adventis Pharma, 579 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D.P.R.
2008).
99. Id. at 223.
100. Id. at 228-29. The court did not cite or discuss Karl.
101. Id. at 229.
102. Id. at 230 ("Even assuming ... the direct to consumer advertising exception,
the record in this case is devoid of any evidence intimating that decedent even saw
informational material regarding [the drug] prior to his visit" to his physician.).
103. Id.
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the first to articulate the relationship between direct-to-consumer
advertising and the learned intermediary rule. Perez held, in perti
nent part, that
when mass marketing of prescription drugs seeks to influence a
patient's choice of drug, a pharmaceutical manufacturer that
makes direct claims to consumers for the efficacy of its products
should not be unqualifiedly relieved of a duty to provide proper
warnings of the dangers or side effects of the product. I04

This is a more nuanced approach to direct-to-consumer adver
tising than the Karl court's wholesale rejection of the learned inter
mediary doctrine. It recognizes that the existence of direct-to
consumer advertising in a particular case should be grounds for an
exception to the learned intermediary rule, not grounds for rejec
tion of the rule altogether. In that respect, the courts in Schilt and
Mendez, while they did not ultimately adopt a direct-to-consumer
advertising exception, seem to be on the right track in what they
implicitly require of plaintiffs to justify future adoption of such an
exception.
As I have previously argued, the courts should alter the appli
cation of the learned intermediary rule to parallel the related but
distinct "sophisticated user doctrine."lo5 Like the learned interme
diary rule, the sophisticated user doctrine is applied in situations
where warnings are given to an entity other than the end user of a
product.106 Unlike the learned intermediary rule, however, the so
phisticated user doctrine explicitly allows the court to analyze
whether, in the context of a particular case, the decision to rely
solely on a third-party intermediary to convey warnings to the end
user was justifiable, thus shielding the defendant manufacturer
from liability to the end user. 107
The main difficulty with the traditional application of the
learned intermediary rule to cases involving direct-to-consumer ad
vertising is that the rule does not permit an individualized determi
nation of whether the so-called intermediary is actually performing
the purported function that the law ascribed to her. lOS The classic
formulation of the learned intermediary rule explicitly forecloses, in
104. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1247 (N.J. 1999) (emphasis
added).
105. Hall, supra note 43, at 239-44.
106. Id. at 242.
107. Id. at 242-44.
108. Id. at 225.
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exchange for judicial efficiency and ease of operation,109 an inquiry
into the role of non-intermediary sources of information, including
express attempts by the manufacturer to bypass the role of the in
termediary and provide information directly to the potential
consumer.ll 0
Direct-to-consumer advertising is by definition advertising; in
other words, it is not designed solely to convey information but to
persuade. The effectiveness of this persuasion is evident by the re
turn on investment of the manufacturers' direct advertising expend
itures. l l ] If the practice of communicating directly with consumers
was not efficient, profit-maximizing manufacturers would not en
gage in it. This is not to say that all direct-to-consumer advertising
oversteps appropriate boundaries. Yet, the continuing concern by
Congress and consumer advocates over the content of many such
ads,112 combined with demonstrably lax exercise of extant regula
tory authority by the FDA,ll3 shows that additional oversight is
needed.
A tort regime that allows courts to inquire whether the market
ing practices of drug manufacturers in fact undermine the role of
the physician as gatekeeper to prescription drugs would at least in
part cure the market distortions introduced and perpetuated by the
current tort system. It would reintroduce a disincentive to oversell
the potential benefits of advertised drugs. The learned intermedi
ary rule should be revised to permit plaintiffs to prove that, in the
factual context of any given case, a manufacturer's marketing prac
tices unduly influenced the decision to seek and use a drug, thus
resulting in harm. This will help ensure that the cost of harms are
borne by the party bearing responsibility for that harm, while pre
serving the concept of the physician as the primary, and most desir
able, source for information about prescription drugs and other
treatment options.
First, the law should recognize that drug companies owe drug
consumers a duty to present an accurate and balanced picture of
the risks and benefits associated with a drug once the companies
109. Girod, supra note 36, at 399-406.
110. Hall, supra note 43, at 245-4S.
111. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. It has been suggested that a two
year moratorium on direct-to-consumer advertisements could cost the drug industry ten
billion dollars in sales. See Aaron Smith, Banning Drug Ads Could Cost $1OB, CNN
MONEY.COM, Aug. 1, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005IOS/01/news/fortune500/direct
consumer/index.htm.
112. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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make the choice to step beyond the traditional bounds of the physi
cian-patient relationship and communicate directly with the con
sumer via direct-to-consumer advertisements. Second, the law
should recognize that this duty is breached when a company's direct
marketing practices overemphasize benefit over risk or engage in
other forms of overpromotion of the advertised drug. Third, such
overpromotion should be acknowledged to cause legally cognizable
damages when it can be shown that, but for the overpromotional
activities of the manufacturer, the patient would not have used the
drug. This proof could take the form of a showing that the patient
was induced to obtain the drug outside normal physician-patient
channels, such as through an Internet pharmacy that requires no
meaningful physician interaction to generate a prescription; that the
patient acted against medical advice in taking the drug; or that the
patient engaged in doctor-shopping to obtain the drug in response
to the manufacturer's promotional message. In any case, the mere
presence of a licensed physician in the chain of distribution should
no longer in and of itself dispose of the plaintiff's claim.
This revision of the learned intermediary rule would not consti
tute a radical expansion of tort law or require a wholesale rejection
of the learned intermediary rule in the vast majority of cases. It
would merely bring the law governing the duty to warn, in the phar
maceutical context, in line with the duty to warn in other areas
where a third-party intermediary is in a position to convey warnings
to the ultimate users of a product. 114 The drug manufacturer would
benefit from a presumption that the traditional doctor-patient rela
tionship ensures that the consumption of dangerous drugs is under
taken only after an educated, informed consideration of risks and
benefits,l15 However, unlike the current rule, that presumption
should no longer be irrebuttable.
114. See, e.g., Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the
New Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193,221-23 (2004) (describ
ing the "sophisticated user doctrine" under which warnings to third parties are, under
certain circumstances, sufficient to discharge the duty to warn); 3 AMERICAN LAW OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY §33:16, at 30 (3d rev. ed. 2006) (A "supplier's duty to warn is
discharged by providing information to third parties whom it can reasonably expect will
communicate the information to the ultimate users. ").
115. See, e.g., In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379
(5th Cir. 1999). In that case the court, while adopting the learned intermediary rule to
shield the manufacturer from liability, stated that even if the learned intermediary doc
trine did not apply in cases involving direct-to-consumer advertising, no liability would
attach if the plaintiff were not in fact exposed to, or did not rely on, the marketing
claims of the manufacturer.
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CONCLUSION

Many of the characteristics of the current market for direct-to
consumer advertisements are the result of an unequal set of incen
tives for drug manufacturers. Virtually all of the market incentives
are pro-advertisement, and there is a notable lack of incentives ei
ther to advertise with the best interest of patients in mind, or to be
conservative in avoiding deceptive or misleading advertisements.
Recent developments show that voluntary advertising guidelines
are not effective in preventing deceptive or misleading advertising
practices. Further, under the failure-to-warn tort doctrine, as cur
rently interpreted and applied, tort law is unable to act as an effec
tive deterrent against irresponsible behavior.
In the past two years, courts have shown a new willingness to
consider claims that direct-to-consumer advertising undermines the
rationale for the learned intermediary rule. 1 16 State courts
presented with the learned intermediary rule as a doctrine of first
impression should follow the lead of the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia in Karl and carefully consider whether the extent
of direct-to-consumer advertising justifies amendment, if not abro
gation, of the rule in the context of claims in which plaintiffs claim
reliance on overreaching advertisement and overpromotion.l 17
Federal courts applying state law should be reticent to assume that
state courts would not take notice of the dramatically changed mar
ketplace for information about prescription drugs in considering the
contours of the learned intermediary rule. Finally, even in states
where the learned intermediary doctrine has been adopted, plain
tiffs' lawyers should make good faith arguments for the modifica
tion of this doctrine in light of the increasing prevalence of, and
issues surrounding, direct-to-consumer advertising. In this way,
hopefully the common law will evolve an approach to pharmaceuti
cal products liability litigation that reflects the complexity of the
pharmaceutical marketplace.

116. See supra notes 62-89 and accompanying text.
117. See generally Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va.
2007).

